





OPERATIONAL PERIOD – II

Incident Commander-Beck Atkinson

June 10, 2009

- **1530 hrs:**
 - Team #16 organized and dispatched from parking lot
- **1550 hrs:**
 - Report from Team #9, they have Harrington for 2 hours. They are hunkering down due to weather but two members will escort Harrington to base
- **1600 hrs:**
 - Weather getting bad Lobo #454 and Capflight 3074 both enroute. Capflight to maintain high bird, Lobo #454 to go to presumed crash site
- **1615 hrs:**
 - Team #8 and #9 at Advance base/Puerto Nambe
- **1635 hrs:**
 - From Logistics: as of 1445 Team #8 is now Team B, enroute to Lake Katherine
 - Team #2 is Ridge Relay
 - Team A is Hasty Team enroute to Harrington then to crash site




OPERATIONAL PERIOD – II

Incident Commander-Beck Atkinson

June 10, 2009

- **1640 hrs:**
 - CapFlight #3074 and Lobo #454 circling crash site, attempt photos
- **1700 hrs:**
 - Report from Team #9, they have Harrington for 2 hours. They are hunkering down due to weather but two members will escort Harrington to base
- **1705 hrs:**
 - Team #16 at wilderness gate, heading to ABC Staging area
- **1710 hrs:**
 - Team B bringing boyfriend to Incident Base for debrief
- **1737 hrs:**
 - Lobo #454 reports high clouds over crash site, still not visible




OPERATIONAL PERIOD – II

Incident Commander-Beck Atkinson

June 10, 2009

- **1743 hrs:**
 - Lobo #454 spotted blue tent believed to be from lost hikers, 4 miles east of known crash site
- **1800 hrs:**
 - Per Lobo #454, Team A closing in on crash site by foot. Coordinates not available
- **1816 hrs:**
 - Team A at 606 crash Site
- **1842 hrs:**
 - Team A on the wreckage/debris
- **1853 hrs:**
 - Team A finds pilots manual-instructed to search Northwest incline for subjects and larger wreckage




OPERATIONAL PERIOD – II

Incident Commander-Beck Atkinson

June 10, 2009

- **1858 hrs:**
 - Lobo #454 spotted tail rotor high on ridge (presumed NW)
- **1900 hrs:**
 - Team A finds ELT and is advised they can turn it off.
Located with the tail rotor
- **1925 hrs:**
 - Team A spots cabin of wreckage
- **1930 hrs:**
 - Team #54 was created from 18 searchers already on the mountain. Heading to crash site with stokes
- **1940 hrs:**
 - Fuselage and door visible by Team A



OPERATIONAL PERIOD – II

Incident Commander-Beck Atkinson


June 10, 2009

- **1949 hrs:**
 - Team A reported they have not seen subjects but observed clothing on a ridge but too steep to eval
- **1952 hrs:**
 - Lobo #454 could land on ridge and extract Team A
- **2007 hrs:**
 - Team A, all 5 members picked up on ridge by Lobo #454. Team taken to Nat. Guard base at Santa Fe airport for debrief

SAR MISSION REPORT

March 25, 2010

GARY CASCIO
JULY 16, 2009, CORRESPONDENCE



Attachment 2

Gary Cascio
SAR 112
22 Mimosa Road
Santa Fe, NM 87508

July 16, 2009

Chief Faron Segotta
New Mexico State Police
4491 Cerrillos Road
P.O. Box 1628
Santa Fe, NM 87504-1628

Re: SAR Mission # 09-01-05
SP606 Crash

Dear Chief Segotta:

I was the first operational period Incident Commander during SAR Mission #09-01-05 in which 606 crashed.

During that first operational period, I experienced personnel issues with two members of Albuquerque Mountain Rescue that were severe enough, in my opinion, to endanger the mission, cause harm to our teams in the field and possibly delayed the discovery of the crash location. It is my belief these two members should be permanently barred from participating in all future New Mexico Search and Rescue missions.

The two members of AMRC are Marc Beverly and Jason Williams. They and their team arrived at Incident Base and refused any assignment my Operations Section Chief, Lee Onstott gave them. At one point, Jason Williams (apparently) made a phone call to the National Guard (a critical resource and only to be contacted by the Area Commander) and then handed me his phone in an attempt to get the National Guard officer to talk me into letting them pick up his team and fly them into the mountains. At that time there was a raging snowstorm and high winds on Santa Fe Baldy and I didn't want any one to fly anywhere.

After discovering AMRC would not accept any of our assignments, I walked over to the team and told them if they could not help, I wanted everyone, unless they had medical training, to leave Incident Base. It appears that none of them left and later, some of them told my staff they had medical training, which according to several people I have spoken to about this, was not true.

During a planning session with my Incident Command staff, Marc Beverly came into our meeting, complaining about the latest assignment we tried to give his team (which required walking into the mountains) and saying he didn't think his team was prepared to accomplish that assignment. After he left, (and evidently came into your side of the command van and began complaining in front of you) I asked James Newberry to have Marc personally escorted off the mountain. James told me that would be done. In my opinion Marc had caused too much trouble to my staff, to me and to the mission for me to deal at the time. I learned later he never left Incident Base and continued to cause even worse trouble for the Incident Commander, Beck Atkinson, who relieved me.

While I am extremely reluctant to ever ask AMRC to participate in any mission I am running as Incident Commander, I will never allow Marc Beverly and Jason Williams to be involved in any mission I run. Many other SAR volunteers have expressed their concerns to me about this team and these two members in particular. They are incapable of operating according to the prescribed law covering search and rescue in New Mexico, are a potential danger to anyone involved in search and rescue missions here, and, in my opinion, must be removed from our ranks.


Sincerely;

Gary Cascio
SAR 112
690-0542

SAR MISSION REPORT

March 25, 2010

BECK ATKINSON
AUGUST 9, 2009, CORRESPONDENCE



Attachment 3

**SEARCH AND RESCUE FIELD COORDINATOR FOR
NEW MEXICO STATE POLICE**

H. Beck Atkinson

**P. O. Box 577
Angel Fire, New Mexico 87710**

**575/377-6642
FAX 575/377-6631**

August 9, 2009

Chief Faron Segotta
New Mexico State Police
New Mexico Department of Public Safety
P. O. Box 1628
Santa Fe, New Mexico 87504

Dear Chief Segotta,

This is a lengthy letter for which I apologize, but which I find necessary. As you are aware, there were problems with several SAR Responders during the '606' Incident. I feel that the activities of some of the Albuquerque Mountain Rescue Council SAR Team members and one of the Type-I SAR Field Coordinators who has close ties to the team were inexcusable. The actions of Marc Beverly, Jason Williams, and Stephen Attaway jeopardized the safety and the well-being of some of their own team members and other SAR Responders. In my opinion their conduct was deplorable, and the distractions they caused had a very negative impact on other SAR Responders. They were asked to leave the Incident Base and the area and disassociate themselves from the SAR Mission. They didn't leave the area but counilled with Gary Williams, one of the two Type-I SAR FCs onscene. The mission at that time was being managed by Gary Cascio, Type-IV Field Coordinator, who was the Incident Commander.

When Mr. Williams arrived at the Incident Base, he should have assumed the management of the mission. The mission was a 'High Profile' mission, by definition a 'Type-I' incident, and it should have been taken over by him as the Incident Commander. Despite not taking formal control of the incident, he issued orders, ordered resources and created problems, along with the various members of the AMRC, namely Marc Beverly and Jason Williams; they in turn created problems for the current Command Staff. In a later conversation with Mr. Williams a few days after the mission closed, he stated the reason Marc Beverly and Jason Williams did not initially want to deploy to the field after being briefed out and given Task Assignments was that they and their teammates did not have the proper gear to go into the high altitudes in snow, rain, and cold temperatures. They had sent one of their team members back to Albuquerque to round up additional equipment and gear suitable for the conditions, and it was some time before the person returned to the IB with the gear. I asked Mr. Williams at that time if the AMRC Team had been ordered to the search for Ms. Yamamoto or if they had been ordered after '606' went down, and he said that he had called AMRC after learning of the crash. I told him that I found it strange that a SAR Team of their reputed expertise responded to the scene for a mission at high altitude unprepared to deploy in the reported weather conditions which surrounded the crash of '606'. Mr. Williams said that they were not unprepared, merely not prepared to deploy in those conditions. One of the other situations involved the AMRC Team refusing to carry out their next assignments to locate the crash site and any possible survivors until they had located their missing team member who coincidentally walked into their camp a short time later. I later learned from another source that Marc Beverly and Jason Williams were talking directly to the National Guard in an attempt to get them to land a BlackHawk at the IB, pick up the team, and insert them at a higher altitude because they did not want to deploy on foot.

When I asked Mr. Williams why he didn't take over the management of the mission upon his arrival onscene, he said he was too rattled and really didn't know what was happening. He said that he had been talking to Leighann Tingwall on the telephone when '606' went down, and he was upset that he had lost a friend. When he called my home at midnight, he told me the following: "606 is down, it is really bad. I am going off of Area Commander Duty. I briefed Bob Lathrop (the AC who followed him on duty), and I am leaving Albuquerque and driving to the IB at the Santa Fe Ski Basin to take command of the mission because the Mission is a Type-I incident and I am the only Type-I around". He then made a request: "Can you come down and help me out?" When I arrived around 0330 hours at the IB, I had a very difficult time getting a briefing from Mr. Williams on his actions taken thus far. I found out much later when I took over the management of the mission from the original IC, Gary Cascio, that Mr. Williams had not done much in the way of getting things sorted out, let alone managing the current mission resources other than AMRC. Mr. Williams had evidently contacted the National Guard shortly after the crash and ordered them to fly, and there was very little else on his part contributed to the mission.

I did learn later that he engaged in some 'micro-managing' detrimental to the ongoing efforts to locate the crash site, the missing AMRC SAR Responder (Jonas Anderson), and Ms. Yamamoto's friend, Paul Harrison. After Mr. Williams excused himself and signed out of the mission, I feel he was still a distracting influence on the mission even though he had left the area and was not involved in the mission. I am not sure of Mr. Williams's motivation, but he has a long history of interrupting ongoing missions in which he has no interest other than to promote the use of AMRC personnel. He will call the Area Commander on duty and suggest engaging the National Guard to fly Marc Beverly and Jason Williams to a scene in a BlackHawk so they can help, and in some cases, he has Marc and Jason contact the IC directly to make that suggestion. In most cases, the interference is unnecessary and the suggestions not needed. Most of the Type-I's are proficient at their jobs, and they have in the past requested assistance from other ACs if needed. The resources on hand have proven more than adequate; this results in Mr. Williams causing interference and creating distractions which, for the most part, is unnecessary and unappreciated. During missions, emotions run high; professionals do not let their emotions jeopardize other individuals' lives or the missions. As a result of this experience, I will have a very difficult time working with these individuals and anyone associated with the AMRC Team whenever I am on Area Commander duty.

I feel this matter should be brought before the SAR Review Board to be scrutinized as the Board is the vehicle in place to handle matters of this nature. I understand that the SAR Review Board has not met for a number of years, and there might be a problem with that aspect of the New Mexico SAR Program. It is my understanding that the SAR Review Board is charged to review all candidates submitted by the Resource Officer for the position of SAR Field Coordinators, their promotions, et cetera, and to make recommendations to the Chief of the New Mexico State Police for approval. The Board is supposed to review applications of new SAR Teams and recommend their being certified. There are a large number of individuals who have been functioning as FCs and even promoted to ACs, along with a few teams responding as SAR Teams, who I am not sure have been through that process during the past few years.

The New Mexico SAR Review Board has been dormant for the past few years, and this is an oversight which needs to be rectified. Members of the Board are specified by its charter or by state law. The Chair is supposed to be a member of the general public who I interpret as a civilian who has no Search and Rescue experience, only to learn that Mr. Williams is the Governor's appointee as the Chair until the year 2012. I see this as a definite conflict of interest. I am sure this is an oversight also and will be corrected before the next meeting of the Board.

The other matter is the recent resignation of the State SAR Resource Officer, James Newberry. Mr. Newberry has been deficient in the recruitment and training of new Section Chiefs and Field Coordinators. The attrition rate of people leaving the NM SAR Program for various reasons has been faster than the replacement cycle to replace them, and we are running critically low on trained Command Staff capable of managing large complex missions. In the past few years, various training opportunities were scheduled by Mr. Newberry for the positions of ACs, FCs, SCs, PIOs, and Safety Officers. He would publish training dates and locations only to cancel at the last minute with little or no notice; various

reasons would be cited that at best sounded lame such as being unable to locate suitable instructors, no place to hold classes, no money to reimburse participants, too far for people to travel, wrong time of the year to hold classes, et cetera. This has been a long-standing problem with the RO. When some of the volunteers offered to help secure facilities or venues for the classes or to even teach classes, he would tell them not to bother as he would take care of it. In some cases he would not try to secure a proper location until a few days before the scheduled classes only to find the facility unavailable, and he would not contact the instructors about teaching until the Monday or Tuesday before the scheduled Saturday class. Due to his inability to turn out new Overhead and Command Staff, we are strapped on larger missions to sustain a proper effort, and in some cases, the initial response to produce a quality operation for the subjects and their families opens up the SAR Program to negative criticism.


Along the lines of the various classes for Staff positions, the Type-I FCs as a group have requested a standard curriculum following the Incident Command System published guidelines for all the classes. Before the era of cancelling the various sessions, the instructors were teaching their versions of what they thought the position required making a vast difference in what was being taught, what was being learned, and what was being put into practice in the field. It makes for some very interesting missions for some of the ICs when the Staff applies non-standard practices to the various positions.

I feel that when the search begins for the new Resource Officer, I feel we need someone with SAR experience and management capabilities. It is going to be difficult to find someone who has vast New Mexico SAR Program experience, FC and SC training, and proficiency with organization, but I feel the policy of promoting from within would be my recommendation for a suitable replacement. We need someone who can travel to the different Districts to talk to District Commanders, Lieutenants, Sergeants, and even officers about the benefits of the New Mexico SAR Program and the need to restore it to its position of prominence in the SAR community. At one time the New Mexico SAR Program was among the best in the country, but during the past few years it has slipped out of control and gone down downhill.

I have been involved as a volunteer SAR Responder for many years and have devoted many hours to serving the citizens of New Mexico and other visitors to our state who have needed assistance. I have been proud to be associated with the New Mexico State Police and the many unselfish SAR volunteers who have worked diligently over the years to make the New Mexico SAR Program a success, and I just don't want the program to fail.

I appreciate your interest in these matters and if you have any questions of me, please give me a call.

Best regards,


A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'H. Beck Atkinson', with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

H. Beck Atkinson
Type-I SAR Field Coordinator

SAR MISSION REPORT

March 25, 2010

TASK ASSIGNMENT



Attachment 4

"TEAM A" s of ~14:30

TASK ASSIGNMENT

Team Number / Call Sign	Mission Number	Operational Period	Date
TEAM 10	09 - 01 - 05	2	Jun. 10, 2009

Type of Team	Name (Team Leader First)	Resource Name	Skill / Equipment
☒ Hasty / Medical	1 Marc Beverly	AMRC	Paramedic
☐ Tracking	2 Jason Williams		IVs
☐ Litter	3 Justin Steele 2233	Team 10	Major Trauma
☐ Grid/Line	4 Carlos 2330		
☐ Vehicle	5 Steve Hall 2220		
☐ ATV	6		
☐ Dog	7		
☐ Horse			
☐ Helicopter			
☐ Fixed Wing			
☐ Snowmobile			
☐ Boat/ Amphibian			
☐ Communications			
☐ Technical Rope			
☐ Confinement			
☐ Strike Team			
☐ Task Force		(Strike Team/Task Force Leader)	

Assignment Date	Estimated Departure Time	Actual Departure Time	Estimated Time in Segment
Radio Frequency	Briefed by	Reviewed by	
	M. Warren		

Sketch Map of Assignment	Briefing Summary
Mountain Rescue EMS Victim got into car & drove off road - downed in ravine rescue - 1st - series of calls terrain down road	☒ Overview ☐ Org. Chart ☐ Time Frame ☐ Subject Info ☐ Lost Person Stats ☐ Clues ☒ Tactics ☐ Rescue Plan ☐ Maps / Datum ☐ Family / Media ☐ Condition Code ☐ Pickup Time ☐ Check-in Plan ☒ Communication ☒ Terrain ☒ Weather ☒ Safety

Assignment and /or Location in the Field:
Proceed to area NW of Santa Fe Bldg and
search for 606, Take DF equipment.

500 0483 T...

TASK ASSIGNMENT

17A

667

Team Number / Call Sign	Mission Number	Operational Period	Date
SIX	09 - 01 - 05	First	06/10/09

Type of Team	Name (Team Leader First)	Resource Name	Skill / Equipment
☒ Hasty	1 Roy Jorgensen	AMRC	EMT A
☐ Tracking	2 Mark Anderson	AMRC	EMT A
☐ Litter	3 Jones Anderson	AMRC	EMT A
☐ Grid/Line	4 Mark Olch	AMRC	EMT A
☐ Vehicle	5		
☐ ATV	6		
☐ Dog	7		
☐ Horse			
☐ Helicopter			
☐ Fixed Wing			
☐ Snowmobile			
☐ Boat/ Amphibian			
☐ Communications			
☐ Technical Rope			
☐ Confinement			
☐ Strike Team			
☐ Task Force		(Strike Team/Task Force Leader)	

Assignment Date	Estimated Departure Time	Actual Departure Time	Estimated Time in Segment
Radio Frequency	Briefed by	Reviewed by	


Sketch Map of Assignment	Briefing Summary
To: 043657 up Winsor trail 39 65918 to coordinates Taking ELPER to give to SP5AR People on team 1 & 2 Out 0045	☒ Overview ☐ Org. Chart ☐ Time Frame ☐ Subject Info ☐ Lost Person Stats ☐ Clues ☒ Tactics ☐ Rescue Plan ☐ Maps / Datum ☐ Family / Media ☐ Condition Code ☐ Pickup Time ☐ Check-in Plan ☒ Communication ☒ Terrain ☒ Weather ☒ Safety

Assignment and /or Location in the Field:

SAR MISSION REPORT

March 25, 2010

CHECK-IN LIST



Attachment 5

CHECK-IN LIST

Mission Number	Location:	Date	Page #	of #
09 - 01 - 05	☐ Incident Command Post ☐ Staging Area ☐ Helibase	6/10/09	4	26

#	N - Name T - Team Name or Affiliation H - Home Base	Non-volunteer	S - Length of Stay C - Cell Phone # A - Amateur Call Sign	Specialized Skills (Explain type)	Other Skills Field Certified	Privately Owned Vehicle	Check-in Date Time	Check-out Date Time	Total Hours (Nearest hour)
1	N STEPHEN ATTARD T AMRC H	☐	S 1 Hours C A	☐ Med ☐ FC ☐ SC	☐ Field Cert.	☐	6/10/09 01:00	6/10/09 11:58	12
2	N SEAN WILSON T APO 129 H	☒	S C A	☐ Med ☐ FC ☐ SC	☐ Field Cert.	☐		6/11/09 1100	
3	N Mark Anderson T AMRC H APO	☐	S 48 Hours C 505-331-2431 A	☒ Med EMT-B ☐ FC ☐ SC	☐ Field Cert.	☐	6/10/09 01:00	6/11/09 11:20	10.5
4	N Roy Jorgensen T AMRC H APO	☐	S 48 Hours C A	☐ Med ☐ FC ☐ SC	☐ Field Cert.	☐	6/10/09 11:00	6/11/09 10:00	9
5	N Thomas Anderson T AMRC H APO	☐	S 48 Hours C A	☐ Med ☐ FC ☐ SC	☐ Field Cert.	☐	6/10/09 1:00	6/11/09 12:03	11
6	N Mark Olah T AMRC H APO	☐	S 48 Hours C A	☐ Med ☐ FC ☐ SC	☐ Field Cert.	☐	6/10/09 1:00	6/11/09 12:03	11
7	N Samantha Schwartz T AMRC H APO	☐	S 48 Hours C A	☐ Med ☐ FC ☐ SC	☐ Field Cert.	☐	6/10/09 1:00	6/11/09 12:03	11
8	N Frank Lobkowsky T NMSAR H AIB	☐	S 12 Hours C 362-4094 A 1N5ZW	☐ Med ☐ FC ☐ SC	☐ Field Cert.	☐	6/10/09 0125	6/10/09 0855	8.5

Totals for this side only	Total Volunteer Personnel	7	Total Volunteer Hours	72
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CHECK-IN LIST

Mission Number	Location:	Date	Page #	of #
09-01-06	☐ Incident Command Post ☐ Staging Area ☐ Helibase	6/4/09	3	26

#	N - Name T - Team Name or Affiliation H - Home Base	Non-volunteer	S - Length of Stay C - Cell Phone # A - Amateur Call Sign	Specialized Skills (Explain type)	Other Skills Field Certified	Privately Owned Vehicle	Check-in Date Time	Check-out Date Time	Total Hours (Nearest hour)
1	N <u>MARE BEVELLY</u> T <u>(AMRC)</u> H	☐	S _____ Hours C <u>505-264-8344</u> A	☒ Med <u>PA</u> ☐ FC ☐ SC	☒ Field Cert	☐	090610 070010	070010 2300	
2	N <u>Jason Williams</u> T <u>(AMRC)</u> H	☐	S <u>(505)</u> Hours C <u>249-0170</u> A	☒ Med <u>EMT</u> ☐ FC ☐ SC	☐ Field Cert	☐	090610 070010	070010 2300	
3	N <u>Chris Nar</u> T <u>SFSAR</u> H	☐	S _____ Hours C <u>505-603-5812</u> A	☐ Med ☐ FC ☐ SC	☒ Field Cert	☐	6-10-09 12:30am	6-16-09 1350	13.5
4	N <u>Adam Hernandez</u> T <u>Cibola SAR</u> H <u>A/buquerque</u>	☐	S _____ Hours C <u>505-350-9021</u> A	☐ Med ☐ FC ☐ SC	☒ Field Cert	☐	6-10-09 12:40am		
5	N <u>James Newberry</u> T <u>State Police</u> H <u>Santa Fe</u>	☒	S <u>?</u> Hours C <u>469-2140</u> A	☐ Med ☐ FC ☐ SC	☒ Field Cert	☐	12:50 6-10-09	1900 6-11-09	7
6	N <u>Art Fischer</u> T <u>Cibola SAR</u> H <u>ABQ</u>	☐	S _____ Hours C <u>264-5898</u> A <u>KD5-IXA</u>	☐ Med ☐ FC ☐ SC	☒ Field Cert	☐	1250 6/10/09	1350 6/11/09	13
7	N <u>Steve Cisneros</u> T H	☐	S <u>4/4</u> Hours C <u>410-9618</u> A	☐ Med ☐ FC ☐ SC	☒ Field Cert	☐	2300 6/9/09	06/10/09 0930	12
8	N <u>MARE BEVELLY</u> T <u>(AMRC)</u> H	☐	S _____ Hours C A	☐ Med ☐ FC ☐ SC	☐ Field Cert	☐	090610 070010		


Totals for this side only	Total Volunteer Personnel	7	Total Volunteer Hours	37
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SAR MISSION REPORT

March 25, 2010

MARC BEVERLY REPORT

**Crash of New Mexico State Police
Helicopter 606 in the Pecos Wilderness 090105**



Attachment 6

Crash of New Mexico State Police Helicopter 606
in the Pecos Wilderness 090105

Herein is the account of factual information as written by J. Marc Beverly

I responded as a Rescue Leader for Albuquerque Mountain Rescue Council (AMRC). I have been performing volunteer Search and Rescue for the NMSP for over 25 years. My job is to lead our team into the field as a responsible leader for making sure the team is ready for Incident Command's assignments and execute these assignments to the best of our ability. It is also my duty to assure for my team's safety and well being while out on a mission. I am also a team member of Atalaya Search and Rescue as I spend a great deal of time in the Santa Fe National Forest in the winters teaching avalanche courses as a professional mountain guide.

June 9, 2009

Page out from Atalaya Search and Rescue (ASAR) for lost hikers around 15:30 hrs near Santa Fe Baldy and responding out of primary district.

About 21:25 Text from Jason Williams that "606 has landed in the Pecos wilderness to pick up lost hikers" Shortly thereafter I was received a phone call from Jason that said that 606 had crashed.

"State Police helicopter indicated trouble around 9:30 pm. NMSP Dispatch lost radio contact. Search and rescue under way. 10:37 PM Jun 9th from txt" as per NMSP Twitter page.

Page out from Albuquerque Mountain Rescue Council (AMRC) at about 21:35 hours.

I Responded from ABQ and picked up the team gear and Jason Williams on the way to Incident Base (IB). Weather in Abq was partly cloudy and warm. The page out information was that the "NM State Police 606 helicopter had crashed and that ARMC was to respond to the staging area." Jason was able to get the last known GPS coordinates and I was able to locate the proposed crash site location at or near a ridge (see Figure 1): GPS UTM NAD83 13S, 432132, 3966549, 12,167'

INCIDENT BASE:

When driving up the Hyde State Park road towards the Santa Fe Ski Area it became apparent that the weather was about to turn for the worse as clouds gathering from the west were low and the Sangre de Cristo Mountains were already enshrouded by clouds down to the 10,000 foot level. We pulled in at the Overlook Parking Area (location of Incident Base) and advised the IC staff that we had arrived along with two other members from AMRC. We were told to sign in, which we did, and then were told to be ready to go in to the field.

We listened to the NMSAR frequency 155.160 and heard that it was snowing up higher. Reports were coming in that there was high snow accumulation of 4-6 inches at Puerto Nambe and at about 11,000 feet elevation and large snowflakes blowing sideways. At higher elevations the snow was falling at greater than an inch per hour for the last 4 hours. Slightly lower in elevation it was raining and teams were reporting temperatures above freezing, but that they it was "very cold and wet."




Figure 1 Map of possible wreckage site (left waypoint) prior to arriving at Incident Base. The right waypoint (is the actual wreckage site.

Other AMRC team members and members from other teams were arriving. I had all the members from AMRC gather at my truck that was parked next to Incident Base Command Vehicle, and as I was the most experienced Rescue Leader on scene and so took charge of our team (AMRC) prior to approaching the ICS with what resources AMRC had. As well, I obtained a weather forecast from the NOAA Weather Radio: "Severe rain and thunderstorms expected from Clines Corners, north through the Sangre de Cristo and Upper Rio Grande Valley tonight, increasing in severity through Wednesday morning. Chance of rain 60% in Santa Fe and Espanola Valley. Snow in higher elevations. Winds 40 miles per hour along the Upper Rio Grande Valley" This forecast was for below 6000' in the Rio Grande Valley.

All members were prepared to stay out for 24 hours as per team policy. However, because of the weather and location of the possible crash site, it was looking like the mission would extend well beyond 24 hours in the field and under "survival conditions." I advised the team that everyone would need full winter gear.

A report then came in that the conditions were "too icy to go on and that Team 1 was cliffed-out and could not go on any further." An AMRC team member advised me that they were in the (possible search) area about two days prior and had seen a

large amount of snow in the region and that it was possible to ski the north facing slopes. This added to my concern that we would need technical snow, ice, and rock equipment on top of the already heavy survival equipment. I reasoned that if people could not stay out for 2 days in these conditions, that it was not safe, nor effective for them to go into the field. I discussed this with Bill Scherzinger and he agreed. We had to send some of our team members home as they were not informed of the radically different conditions from the initial page-out from ICS. The weather was partly cloudy with broken skies and mild temperature (shorts and T-shirt) when I stepped out the door to respond to this mission. It would be difficult to have known what the conditions were like without being properly informed.

At about 22:30 hours and were told to get ready to be air lifted to an area that would be close to the crash site by Gary Casio (Incident Commander). James Newberry was present, which is not a normal situation that the SAR Resource Officer is on scene, and confirmed that we would be air lifted to a closer location. As a Rescue Leader, I advised the AMRC team to get ready to be flown in, and split teams up for staged helicopter insertions so that IC could dispatch us as needed. We were planning on taking more equipment than what we would have packed in from the Windsor Trailhead since we would be quite far away from any back up support and likely out of radio communications and therefore without support for a long time in adverse conditions. About 10 minutes later the Incident Commander (Gary Casio) came over to us and barked at us that "(we) were going to be sent up the Windsor Trail" and asked us if we were ready." We said that James Newberry had just confirmed with us that we were going to be flying out any minute as a helicopter was flying overhead. Casio then raised his voice and yelled, "You work for me not for James." He then turned and walked back to the Command vehicle. Steve Crawford then pulled yellow tape from his vehicle that was next to mine and strung it to and ARES truck that pulled in behind me, separating the ICS team from everyone else. We stood there and waited not knowing what to do and the rain began to fall.

I gathered the team again and told them that we would likely be going into the field on foot at this point and to get ready for that mission. About 80 percent of the people had enough gear to go out, but did not have enough for the greater than expected possible time out in the field, nor was there extra equipment for the *undeclared* Multi-Casualty Incident including extra clothes and equipment for up to 4 subjects since we were unaware of the situation from the time of the page out and had not yet been formally briefed. We were not informed that there was more than one person involved in this incident from the initial call out. appropriate actions would have been taken had we known this. The remaining people who did not have enough equipment I had to send home where they were able to get more equipment and return the following morning.

I was able to assemble a team with adequate equipment and what I figured to be adequate experience as requested by ICS. My briefing them included the objective for the mission, radio frequencies and communication limitations, emergency plans, objective hazards including environmental concerns of freezing temperatures, wind and rain/snow, loose rock and icy terrain, whiteout navigation in alpine terrain with cornices and possible avalanche terrain and mitigation (as proved true with Rich Seimer's account as well as Team 1). I appointed Roy Jorgenson as the Team Leader of "Team 6" and advised him to take care of the team, keep everyone together, and wished him good luck. Their assignment was to get a NELT to "Team 1." I elected to stay behind to continue to manage the AMRC members and resources for further assignments and prepare for helicopter transport. I would be serving as the Technical Leader on this team and Jason Williams as the Medical Leader (as per our usual status).

Bill Scherzinger and I discussed the situation at length and agreed to only send the most qualified people into the field at that point. Bill then would return to Abq, send out a message to the team that conditions were "winter-like" and that all members should be well equipped for the mission and not to show up unless they were ready for it.

The rain turned into snow at about 23:30 hours and was accumulating in the parking lot at about 10,000' elevation. We were then told that we would be on stand-by and go out at first light. Shortly thereafter we heard that teams were turning around because the conditions were unsustainable for a search mission and that they were having a hard time staying warm and searchers were becoming hypothermic. We received news that we would not be going to be airlifted in since the National Guard Blackhawk was experiencing icing and would not be able to perform that mission in the present conditions. However, we were not reassigned to another mission.

Ben Goddard, Steve Attaway, Jason Williams and Sam were standing near the back of my truck when Casio came by and yelled, "If you're not going out, then go home." He returned again a few minutes later, but said nothing, then left. The AMRC team members that he was addressing did not have a task assignment and were not clear on what they should be doing as they had not yet been briefed either. Steve Attaway had only one other person to go out into the field with and the AMRC general policy is to have four rescuers in extreme weather conditions. Gary Williams then came by and told us to get some rest because we weren't going to be sent out until later.

We went back to our vehicles and waited until about 05:30 hours when Gary Williams came to get Jason. I waited until called for. Jason went to the ICS Vehicle, and then came back after a few minutes. Jason told me that he received information that teams were pulling out of the field and were getting pinned down by the weather. He said that Roy was bringing Mark Anderson back due to possible frost bite. We both went to the IC Post and presented ourselves for a briefing at the request of the IC Staff. The snow was falling at a rate of S2 but not accumulating and was blowing nearly sideways in a moderate to high sustained winds.

THE ASSIGNMENT

I sat down at a table in the back of the IC vehicle; Jason Williams sitting next to me, both of us two of the most experienced Rescue Leaders on AMRC available to this meeting. We received no greeting or introductions to any of the ICS team. I was only familiar with Steve Crawford who I had worked with a few times in the distant past.

Casio asked how many team members I had. I advised him that I wasn't sure yet since I would have to see what assignment he would be giving us and who was left in the parking lot and who was possibly available en route. He wasn't happy that I didn't have a solid answer for him, but he then showed me where he wanted our team to go in. Hiking on the Windsor Trail, we would be going to Puerto Nambe and then up and over Santa Fe Baldy and searching the entire Upper Rio Capulin Watershed area, essentially the entire slope North to East of Santa Fe Baldy below tree line, at tree line, and above tree line (tree line being about 12,300'). We would be trying to make contact with Team 1 in the field to get some ELT locating equipment to help find the aircraft." (Figure 2). However, they did not know the location of Team 1.

I took a moment to think about the assignment in its entirety. It was a major assignment given the circumstances with low probability of detection (POD), especially in these circumstances. I asked about weather conditions up higher and if there was avalanche hazard with the new Maritime snow that was falling on any possible old snow layers. Sloughs of new fresh accumulated snow could be a potential danger for rescue teams. I know from my experience as a AMGA Certified Rock, Certified Alpine, and Ski Mountaineering Aspirant Guide, UIAGM/IFMGA (International) Aspirant Mountain Guide, AIARE level 1, and Level 2 Avalanche Instructor, and the only AAA Certified Avalanche Instructor in NM, that the present conditions would render possibly high avalanche danger for the immediate future in alpine terrain and avalanche prone slopes. I had calculated the general slope angle on some of the slopes we would be traveling on as between 35 and 40 degrees for nearly 1000' that had an old snow surface with an unknown bonding potential. So, I was inquiring what the possible avalanche conditions might be like. I thought Mr. Crawford might have some insight. Moreover, these conditions were essentially "survival conditions."

My major concern that I wanted to discuss with the ICS team was that teams were pulling out due to weather conditions. There was I stated that "I wasn't comfortable sending out my team in highly adverse conditions when other teams were starting to suffer cold injuries like symptomatic hypothermia and possible frostbite. If we pass them on the trail we will have to stop and help them out and it will compromise our assignment. We will be obligated to assist them." I was told "no, you don't."

I asked the ICS team what the situation was with the weather. Steve Crawford was functioning as Safety Officer and told me "you don't have to worry about the weather, we'll do that." Someone then said to me, "are you afraid of going out there on this mission?" to which I replied, "I'm not afraid, it's just that the conditions are dangerous. I'm more than qualified to go out there, if you don't think so then you can get someone else, but I'm not seeing the risk-benefit ratio being positive." After that, the small room in the back of the Command Vehicle erupted in yelling. Someone said "then take your team and go away if you're not going to take this assignment." Someone else said, "I'm closing this conversation right now, just leave and come back when you're ready to go out." I stood up and walked out of a clearly irrational and highly emotionally charged meeting. I felt like the ICS team had little to no concern for the well-being of the SAR teams either in the field or for our team that was being assigned an insurmountable task in unreasonable conditions. All rescuers know that the first concern is for their own safety, then the safety of their fellow rescuers, then the patient's safety, and I felt like under the present circumstances that rescuer safety was not taken into enough consideration.




Figure 2 shows the approximate proposed search area for our team assignment. The thunderbirds are my best guess as to where ICS had NELT hits.

There was no room for discussion of how the conditions could be mitigated, and there was no other information given to us like how many people we were looking for, their names, etc. The briefing was inadequate and clearly incomplete. As I left the room a police officer in the front of the Command Center said that the weather was coming on News 13 and someone in the meeting room said, "let's watch it." The weather meant everything to the state of the mission during those hours and I based the decision to ultimately not field any teams until conditions changed based on this meeting. The risk-benefit ratio of fielding more teams at this point was poor. The Probability of Area was ambiguous; the Probability of Detection was low as well. I based that on the knowledge of the terrain, the weather, the situation and my experience.

I went back to the truck and listened again to the weather. Gary Williams came by and asked us if we heard the forecast and stated that it's going to get worse. He was right. Not only was the forecast worse, but there were no other teams with members responding. The fieldable rescue members were growing thin and the rescue members returning from assignments in the field were not only ineffective, but too taxed to be reassigned once they returned to IC. There was a 100% non-refieldable rate of rescuers. Gary asked me to get a contact for Colorado SAR teams together. So I called Paul Woodward and Greg Foley at about 07:00 hours to inform them of what was going on and that I was requested to make the contact. I gave the POC numbers to Gary

Williams and James Newberry. In addition, I asked Gary Williams if he would like me to ask Benny Abbruzzo, owner of Ski Santa Fe Ski Area, if we could open up the lodge as a place for the teams to gather. I knew that we were going to need more than just a car heater to treat teams coming in from the field and possibly treat hypothermia and frostbite injuries. I am a Nationally Certified Physician Assistant as well and knew that this would be the only possibility of getting this resource for our team members. He affirmed that I should, so I arranged this with Benny via cell phone. Cody Sheppard, the Ski Patrol Director, showed up at Incident Base and I showed him to the Command Vehicle. Cody let us into the lodge and assigned some of their own employees to help us out and make hot drinks for those coming out of the field.




Figure 3 shows actual wreckage site (courtesy of Kerry Haynes; Google Earth)

Teams were starting to call in that they had members of their group that needed to be either escorted out of the field via motorized transport from Aspen Ranch, or needed medical attention for hypothermia. Rescue member after rescue member came in from the field with hypothermia. Team 6 had apparently split up into two teams as Mark Anderson had gotten frost bite and needed to return to base camp. I found Mark Anderson in the lodge and took a look at his feet. They did not appear to have dermal damage or blistering from the cold, so I suspect that he acquired frost nip, but he was still clearly hypothermic. I stripped off his wet clothes and placed him in a warm sleeping bag and gave him hot drinks. He was incapable of returning to the field.

I met Jimmy from the State Police Horse Team in the lodge and we discussed a plan of coordinating the ingress. I proposed a plan to him that he agreed with. I subsequently approached IC with the idea that the horses could help us establish an Advanced Base Camp (ABC) at Puerto Nambe. This would be an excellent place to have fielded teams regroup, recover and be reassigned. IC agreed and we affected the ingress as stated. We were Team 10 and Teams 13 and 14 were deployed behind us from the Windsor trailhead. I chose Puerto Nambe as a good location for ABC since there was another patient (the boyfriend of the female subject) in the Lake Kathryn area as well as a single rescuer and possible patient in the Hidden Lake area (wreckage site) and we could account for teams coming and going to either of these areas from this location if they were on a main trail since this is the confluence of all trails in the area. I confirmed with ICS that we would be communicating with ICS via a relay station "CD1"

located somewhere in Los Alamos, and that local communications near Hidden Lake were going to need a relay somewhere near the top of Santa Fe Baldy as Hidden Lake area is a East-facing bowl and far beyond the reach of any repeater or line of sight communications, judging from the map.

ADVANCED BASE CAMP (ABC)

This was a staging area that ICS agreed needed to be used as a staging area (see official NMSP report). We would be able to still communicate with ICS via (CD1 out of Los Alamos) and receive instructions as well as perform the original assignments given to us by IC. We would not be able to communicate with ICS any other way.

We passed Mark Olah on the way up to ABC and he gave us the GPS coordinates of where they had found the helicopter wreckage and the only survivor, Wes Cox, who was pacing back and forth to keep warm. He had evidently not hiked out miles to find search and rescue teams as was later reported by the media.

I assigned Andy Simmons as Communications for ABC who kept a running log of all radio communications and events. Jason Williams and Bill Scherzinger were assisting me with coordinating efforts with other teams as to who was able to continue on their assignments. Some teams and members seemed befuddled as to what they were supposed to be doing and were now apparently clear on their mission. Some teams had split up and separated even prior to arriving in ABC.

Priorities of ABC:

- 1) Account for missing rescue member Jonas. He had no radio communication with IC or CD1 and we were unsure of his physical status at this point based upon Mark Olah's condition when we met him on the trail. Mark Olah, his partner from the original Team 6 left Jonas and the patient to establish radio communication. His communications to Incident Base was more than 6 miles away from the crash site. They had apparently given the patient their extra supplies as first aid, including food, water and clothing, and the Black Hawk had hoisted the patient out unannounced to us. IC would not release information to us whether Jonas had been hoisted out or not.
 - a. Team A (alpha) was assigned to locate Jonas at the wreckage site and take care of him if needed. They were also assigned to account for the wreckage (see 3).
- 2) Paul, the other subject somewhere near Lake Kathryn; Team 9 assigned as per IC's original assignment.
- 3) Locating the crash site and accounting for all passengers. Team A as per IC's original assignment.
- 4) Track weather observations
 - a. Visibility was generally obscured and poor. Snow on the ground would not only make search for the wreckage more difficult, but also travel more dangerous, especially in the alpine terrain when after the sun sets, turning snow and residual water to ice.
 - i. Other objective and subjective hazard assessment and reassessment and mitigation.
- 5) Overall communication improvement:
 - a. Attempt to find a better communication method with IC.
 - b. Secure and maintain communication with all members in the field for accountability and safety of all SAR members.

Teams showed up sporadically as they had separated due to different pace. Once at Puerto Nambe, Justin Shook and Steve Hall wanted to go onto Baldy and continue with the mission. I felt that they needed to wait for the remainder of their gear to arrive which was coming by horseback. Rich Seimer and his team soon arrived at about the time the horse team arrived and all were in agreement that Shook, Hall, Seimer, and Rusty Dehresh should continue on as Team A as they were the fastest core group. Seimer had the best terrain familiarity and knowledge of how to gain the crash site the fastest and the other three were strong members (one paramedic) that were well equipped, but lacked local knowledge and needed to follow Seimer. The goal of finding Jonas and gaining access to the crash site was one in the same since we thought the Jonas was still at the crash site.

Again, the safety of the rescue team(s) was paramount. Temperatures were dropping in the late afternoon and I knew that the snow would soon be turning to an icy crust and making travel possibly dangerous for Team A. There had also been no reports of snow stability in the area, so I also advised Team A to be cautious before entering into avalanche terrain. Team members had crampons and ice axes, harnesses, sleeping bags and extra supplies and equipment appropriate for the mission as assigned by ICS.

A radio relay using both 155.160 and 146.820 was established on the SE ridge of Santa Fe Baldy with Kerry Haynes. Mr. Haynes was unable to make communications with Incident Base and also needed to relay via CD1, even from his high position on the ridge. No information was relayed to ABC about Jonas from IC and his whereabouts was of concern to us.

All teams were quick and effective at performing their assignments as outlined by ICS. As the precipitation had become intermittent at around 15:00 hours and the sky became mostly cloudy and then broken nearing sunset.

Team A reached the ridgeline overlooking Hidden Lake and reported that they did not see Jonas, that no tracks were coming back out, and that he must have either been picked up by a helicopter or had left the scene. IC reported that they did not know where Jonas was since he was not at IB.

Jonas arrived in ABC on his own at about 18:20 hrs and Team A's primary objective of finding Jonas was secured, therefore, Team A could continue to attempt to account for all passengers, and secure the crash site as per our instructions. The pilot was not accounted for per Mark Olah's account, only the female. Team A continued on their mission. Jonas retired to one of the supplemental tents but was hallucinating from sleep deprivation, cold exposure, and general extreme fatigue after having traveled more than 20 miles.

I heard instructions over the radio that "Team 9 was to arrest the male (Paul) and bring him back to IB, that he had caused enough problems already." Paul, Yamamoto's friend and one of the subjects was escorted by a "NMSP mounted horse team" as I was told, from Lake Kathryn. He came into ABC and was insistent on knowing where Yamamoto was as he "has spent all day looking for her." He asked that we contact base to get her status and to tell her that he would be meeting her there soon. Not having been instructed to not inform Paul of the situation, I told him that "the helicopter had crashed and that there were three people on board. One survivor, a male NMSP officer was hoisted out." He was mentally stable and strong and was quite grateful for that information, but obviously grief stricken, a normal response. He continued on with being escorted out to IB where he was to be debriefed.

Team 16 arrived in ABC. I knew I would be coming up to my 24 hours of being fielded from the time of dispatch and I felt that this would be a good time to leave the field as all tasks had been accomplished as assigned by ICS and Team 16 was now present and fresh. I was able to pass over the job of being the ABC Site Leader to Fernando Garzon (LAFB) at 18:15 hours and had Andy, who was busy on the radio with CD1, make a note of the transfer of ABC affairs to Mr. Garzon. I advised CD1 to relay this information to IC, which they did via 155.160. I briefed Garzon and had Simmons brief him as well. Jason Williams and I packed up and headed back to Incident Base immediately thereafter via the Windsor Trail.




Figure 4 shows ABC log of time of transfer of ABC duties and Jason William's and my egress from ABC to Incident Base.

On the way back I was listening to the radio and heard that Team A requested air evacuation. I also heard that IC had "a long list of assignments" which ABC had advised "that they would address later, after Team A was out of the field."

BACK AT INCIDENT BASE

We arrived back at Incident Base and I informed them that we were available for formal debrief. I found an ICS personnel who chatted with me outside the IC vehicle (no name tag, so I didn't catch his name), but did not perform a formal written debrief. I asked him if we should do a formal debrief with written documentation. He said, "no, we'll just do it here."

He told me that the ICS "knew where Jonas was the whole time, but didn't want to tell us over the air." I told him that Jonas had explained to me that "he had no communication with anyone and felt abandoned. After waiting for hours for the helo to return, he left, but realized that he could not return safely by going back up to the ridge they initially went in on, so he went by himself around a circuitous route via Stewart Lake, then to Spirit Lake and then back to Puerto Nambe. The snow was too deep and (I) had to find another way out... I couldn't get back up to the trail from Lake Kathryn either since the snow was too deep there as well, so I had to go up via Spirit Lake." I asked the person debriefing me if he knew about that, and he said "no." So Jonas was unaccounted for about 12 hours and IC was not concerned about that. I expressed that this was a big deal, especially if the weather would have continued to be bad. It would have possibly meant that a rescuer could have perished.


He didn't seem to think that it was of major importance and was more concerned about the location of ABC in regards to radio communications. I advised him that there wasn't any better place than where it was established, but I would have preferred to be in direct contact with ICS somehow as not all of the information appeared to have been transmitted to them from ABC via CD1. He inquired how many people were still up there and I figured about 7, although I was told that team 16 was going to be "10 people with provisions for 30." It was apparent that the total number of fielded rescuers was unaccounted for. I did not see any of the other team members getting debriefed as well. The informal debrief was ended and he went into the Command Vehicle. I left the scene and drove home.

SAR MISSION REPORT

March 25, 2010

STEPHEN ATTAWAY REPORT

State Police Helicopter Crash on June 9, 2009



Attachment 7

Mission Report for State Police Helicopter Crash on June 9, 2009

Stephen Attaway

State police helicopter, N606SP, crashed near Santa Fe Baldy Mountain in the Pecos Wilderness Area, northeast of Santa Fe, New Mexico at about 9:30 pm. I received a page from AMRC at 9:51pm.

I left for the mission at 11:30pm. On the drive towards Santa Fe, I monitored on the Ham radio 155.160 traffic between Lobo 440 and IC. The weather on the drive up was partly cloudy with winds. The traffic between Lobo 440 and the IC indicated that the flight conditions on the mountain were difficult with cloud cover blocking part of the mountain.

I arrived at incident base at about 1:00am. Base camp was located about 1 mile from the Winsor trailhead. I signed in and reported to the AMRC team assembled at Marc B's truck. On scene were Marc B, Jason, Roy, Marc O, Jonas, Marc A., and Sam.

I met with the AMRC team to gain an understanding of what was happening. Meeting with the IC staff was not possible due to yellow tape issues. Marc B informed me that a medical team was getting ready to be picked up by Lobo 440 in Aspen Glade. Marc B, Jason W, and Sam were sorting their combined medical and strike rescue gear for the helicopter ride to the top of mountain. Radio traffic confirmed that Lobo 440 was due to pick up the team in Aspen Glade.

I consulted with Marc regarding what was known about the location of the crash. He showed me the plotted point on the map where the crash site was expected to be located.

I heard over the radio that Lobo 440 was not willing to land in Aspen Glade.

My understanding was that there were five teams in the field from the initial part of the search before the crash.

Marc B was in the process of reviewing gear of an AMRC team ready for deployment. Marc was adamant that all team members deployed be well prepared and had already sent team members home who were not fully equipped. The AMRC team ready for deployment included Roy, Mark O, Jonas, and Marc A. I reviewed the pack of each team member ready for deployment. I had an extra freeze dried food box in my SUV (seven days supply for one person). I clearly had more food than I needed, so I offered the extra food to the team members. Each team member packed three extra full freeze dried meals in addition to the food they had already packed. Extra batteries were also distributed as needed, and the fuel needed for stoves were reviewed. As the team left, I supplied each with a large brownie made by my wife.

The field commander came over and stated that the AMRC team must leave NOW.

As the team was getting ready to leave, base camp personnel gave the team a NELT direction finding device with extra batteries. The instruction to the team was to give the NELT to Team 1, experts in using the device.

Team 6 left for the trail at about 2:00am.

The remaining AMRC team members in base were Marc, Jason, Sam, and me. Ben G. later arrived.

At this time, the plan as known was for the medical team (Marc B, Jason W, Sam) to hold in base camp until first light and then be transported into the field by Lobo 440.

I continued to help the team get ready for the mission by sorting gear and taking account of what team gear was available (litter, ropes, medical supplies, etc.). Questions about needed resources and supplies were reviewed and a request for additional gear was relayed to AMRC team members in Albuquerque.

Shortly after Team 1 left for the field, base camp people made the statement that the remaining AMRC team members, who were not part of the medical team, must deploy now or leave the mission. This was not presented to me as an option, but as a threat. I was more than taken aback that, without discussion with me, I was being asked to leave the field.

Ben G. stated that he may not be ready for a full winter mission. I reviewed his gear and found that he was missing winter gloves, sleeping bag, and stove. I found an extra set of leather gloves, but we were not to outfit him with other gear. Under some circumstances, I consider a two person team of experienced AMRC members to be an acceptable risk. This was not one of those times. I did not consider Ben to have the experience or gear needed to deploy as a two person team. Ben also did not believe that he was ready for a potential body recovery.

After first addressing the issue with our team, I approached Gary W. to ask him what I should do. While talking with Gary, the IC came over, and I pleaded my case to him regarding my desire not to leave the mission. I stated that I was ready to go into the field, but Ben was not ready. I stated that I would go into the field as soon as another team was assembled, as I did not think it wise to go into the field by myself.

After obtaining permission to stay, I consulted with my team members regarding the best use of my time. Gary W. suggested that I get some rest so that I could be ready at first light. I retired to my SUV to sleep from 4:00am to 6:00am.

It started to rain hard as I fell into a fitful sleep. Rain continued hard as Marc B. rapped on my window at 6:00am. I was up and ready standing in the rain at 6:04am, ready for field deployment.

Both Marc and Jason requested a meeting in Marc's truck. Marc and Jason told me that they had just returned from a meeting with the IC, where a tense discussion with the IC had occurred. Marc and Jason stated that they had refused to deploy at this time. I asked if the crash site had been found and was informed that the exact location of the crash site was still unknown. A plot of the best and latest estimate showed that the satellite solutions for the site had diverged, and that the crash site could now be more than a mile from the last estimate.

The weather at this time was very poor with 30 ft visibility with a hard rain falling. The temperature was about 35F to 40F degrees @ 10,000' in base camp.

Justin S., Kiki and Carlos arrived sometime later.

Marc B obtained a weather report from the NOAA Weather radio. The report called for a 60% chance of rain in the Espanola Valley, with worsening conditions later, and thunder showers throughout the next 4 days.

I discussed the options with Justin, Marc B, Jason, Gary. We concluded that searching in the current visibility would be of limited use, and that the weather could well be a hazard to the searchers currently in the field. Everyone agreed that we needed to proceed with the mission. However, there was no consensus on what was the best path forward.

Everyone agreed that the weather conditions were horrible, that the current weather was not conducive to searching, and extraordinary concern for safety of the search team members was required. We discussed the likelihood that team members could become victims if the weather continued.

We received word that part of Team 6 was returning to base due to possible frost bite. The weather was making the mission very dangerous for teams in the field. The first team (team 3?) members from the initial search returned to base camp shivering, wet, and exhausted. We asked them details about the conditions and asked for their recommendations. Shortly after the first team came in from the field, the IC requested all teams (including the radio relay on Raven's Ridge) return to base. Our concern for others in the field soon grew, and we became quite concerned that more than one team member may require rescuing.

Without the ability to search in the existing weather, we agreed that establishing a staging camp at the base of Santa Fe Baldy would likely be the best option. A team of Justin, Jason W, Marc B, and Carlos was selected as the strike team that should establish an advanced camp. I was asked by AMRC to stay in base and help organize AMRC team members as they arrived for the mission.

The ski area opened the ski lodge for use as a recovery area.

Roy and Marc A. radioed that Marc A. was returning to base camp, due to possible frost bite on Marc A.'s toes.

We met with the returning team members from Teams 3 or 4. The returning members were soaked and shivering, entering into the first stages of hypothermia.

In the process of coordinating our team, I met with a Dog Search team member that wanted to deploy with our team. He was well dressed, experienced and ready to go. As the advanced camp team was getting ready, I asked if he was ready, and he told me that he would be working plans instead of going into the field. I explained to him that my team has requested me to coordinate the AMRC team members as they went into the field. I assured him that I understood the ICS system and that I understood his and my position within the ICS system. I stated that I would work with him to help formulate team plans, but that I would make no decisions, only present options for him.

Field teams moved to the ski lodge. Roy and Marc A arrived at the ski lodge.

I met with Roy and Marc A. to gain a better understanding of the conditions in the field. Both Roy and Marc A. were soaked. Each had on 4 to 5 layers, and each layer was soaked. Both Roy and Marc A's boots were soaked. Roy had all the right gear for the conditions: gaiters, rain pants, and long-johns. The rain was soaking both team members to the skin, and nothing remained dry. Both Roy and Marc were shivering and hypothermic. Marc A's feet were cold to the touch, pale, and blood did not return to the toes when the nail bed was pressed. Sleeping bags, hot packs, and warm food was prepared and given in the ski lodge. Roy, a 20 year team member, stated that this was the worst weather he had seen and that it "kicked his butt". He thanked me for the extra freeze dried food and stated that he might not have survived without it. Marc A began to re-warm after 20 minutes in a sleeping bag.

While treating Roy and Marc A, I meet with the APD Lieutenant to help coordinate. APD has crossed-trained with AMRC and had shared members. We coordinated to better understand who was ready for the expected severe weather conditions in the field. Some of the team members were in cotton and would have to be better outfitted before going into the field. The APD team was also short of radios.

APD suggested that their horse team could transport gear to the advanced base.

I transported the team leaders for the APD horse team, APD team, and AMRC team to IC to meet with the planning FC. Locating the IC base one mile from the trailhead was convenient for the radio operators but made it difficult to deploy teams to the trailhead.

After a short meeting, team assignments were made for establishing an advanced camp, with the goal of having part of the combined AMRC/APD team travel to the "best" location of the crash.

Bill S., Rusty, and Andy arrived with requested AMRC team gear (extra ropes, ice axe, crampons, tents, sleeping bags for victims, sked, litter, etc.). They were combined with a couple of Cibola team members with an assignment to help establish the staging camp.

Team 1 returned from the field. Each team member was wet and shivering when I approached them at the Winsor trailhead.

I met retired AMRC member (past president) Rick Davis at the Winsor trailhead. He was not part of the mission, but had been on a camping trip with his wife in the area of the crash. He described the weather conditions as awful.

Gear was then sorted, horses were loaded, and the teams were fielded. The horse team members were not dressed properly for the weather conditions. They also did not have lights, so I gave them 4 extra lights. Andy also gave them some of his lights. The horse team members did not have radios either, so I gave them my extra Ham radio. A radio check confirmed it was working. About 15 minutes later one of the horse team members returned to tell me that the radio was no longer working. I gave them my AMRC team radio, assuming that they did not know how to work the Ham radio.

One of the horse team members suffered a minor scrape that required attention, and the medics (LAFB) at the trailhead provided medical care.

Mike O. arrived.

Sam returned from Albuquerque with Pav. Sam also had extra gear requested by AMRC.

Two team members from Team 6 were still missing. I returned to incident base and asked about communication status with Team 6. No contact had been made since the teams had been asked to return from the field. I made a direct request to the communications teams to try to raise Team 6.

Sometime later (about 12:00-1:00 pm or so), I was told that a report from Team 6 stated that they had found a hiker. It was not clear if this was Paul, the subject's boyfriend, or someone from the aircraft.

I returned to base to help organize another field team composed of the remaining members of AMRC, the remaining members of APD, and team members from LAFB.

While in base, I met the planning officer and present him with our suggested options. I asked about the possible find. However, I was told that no information was available to me, and that the situation was very fluid. He stated that the mission could be over in 15 minutes and I should stand by.

AMRC team member Mark O. from Team 6 returned to base camp. He had not been debriefed. I instructed him that he had to talk with the FC, and he met with the IC. After the meeting, I transported him to the ski lodge for food and dry clothes. He met Sam and Pav. Sam (Marc O. girlfriend) was instructed to take care of Marc O. Marc O. informed me of his adventures and told me that he met the advanced camp team on their way into base camp.

He told me that he had to leave Jonas with a very cold crash victim because they could not make radio communication from the crash site. At the time I talked with him, he did not know that Wes had been hoisted out of the field by helicopter. He told me that he had given the coordinates of both the victim and Jonas to the advanced camp team.

From what I learned from Marc O, the remote camp team was working on the assumption that Wes was still in the field with Jonas, and that a medical emergency existed due to Wes being very cold. The FC/IC appeared to be keeping radio silence on the fact that Wes had been hoisted to safety. At about 3:00 pm, I tried to contact members of AMRC by cell phone but was not successful.

At the request of Pav, I asked communications of the status regarding Jonas. I was told by one of the people at base camp that Jonas was OK and had been spotted by the high bird. They stated that he was camped and well prepared, and that he could fend for himself. Base camp stated that Jonas was fine, and that the focus should be on locating the crash site and Andy, the pilot. However, when I met Jonas at the remote camp, he stated that the high bird must have seen his abandoned tarp, and that he was absolutely not fine. In fact, he had given most of his extra clothes and food to Wes. While base camp thought that they knew where Jonas was, the reality was that they knew the exact location of his abandoned tarp.

I met a new planning officer in base. I offered to drive him to the trailhead and have him meet with the leaders of a team of AMRC, APD, LAFB and Cibola who were in the process of assembling their gear. We also traveled to the ski lodge so that he could see the conditions and meet the other team members located there. We met with Sam, Marc O, Pav and Kiki. Pav knew the victim and the reporting party, Paul; they were good friends. In addition, her boyfriend, Jonas, was currently out of contact. Pav decided that she should not deploy.

The combined team packed gear for an overnight stay and were given a team assignment (Team 16) to travel to a remote base with extra food and water.

I was given the assignment of establishing Ham radio communication between the staging camp and base. Radio communications between the field teams and base had been a problem since the radio relay person on Raven's ridge was pulled when all team were pulled from the field in the morning. In retrospect, what was needed was a cross band repeater located on Raven's ridge.

I had some trouble with my Ham radio, and I could not get it to open the IB repeater system due to a combination of tones, offsets, and pager codes. After what seemed like forever (and some ridicule from the FC's), I finally was able to get my radio to work. (Murphy's Law: what I did not know was that my radio had been dropped by one of horse team members, and an internal attachment to the antenna was damaged such that the radio only worked in one position. The radio was damaged beyond repair and only worked when it was close to the communications radio trailer.)

While standing at the communication trailer working on my radio, I heard that the National Guard horse team had found Paul, who was still looking for his girlfriend. I was very surprised when the FC told the team to arrest Paul, handcuff him, and escort him from the scene. Also, Paul was not to be told of his girlfriend's death. The FC stated that "the (explicative) had caused enough trouble".

Rumors at base camp were overheard: Cell phone contact with the pilot was made in the morning (later determined to be a false report). Radio communication was impossible at the crash site, as was cell phone contact. It was announced that Wes walked two miles from the plane and found the rescuers (which was later determined to be false: he was actually found very close to the helicopter crash). It was also announced that Wes and Andy were yelling back and forth throughout the night with loss of contact in the morning, also later stated by Wes to be inaccurate. These rumors were picked up by the press and repeated on television and radio.

During our assignment briefing, we were told that there was a good chance that Andy was still alive.

My team (team 16) left for the remote staging camp. As the team traveled, some team members were more loaded with gear than others, and the teams soon spread out due to different rates of travel. When we regrouped at the top of the ridge, we agreed that the team should split into fast and slow teams on the hike in and then regroup once base camp was reached. Everyone agreed to the split, even though one team member that wanted to be in the fast team but was asked to be on a slower-paced team, due to the fact that he was working on only one hour of sleep. We informed base camp of our decision to split the teams and why that was done.

The LAFB were the fastest walkers, with the APD team second. Mike O and I were last. Mike was loaded with a sked and a pack for a combined weight of over 70 lbs.

We monitored 155.160 as we traveled towards the remote base.

At about 4:30 pm, we heard that Jonas had wandered into the staging camp at Puerto Nambe. He informed them that Wes had been hoisted out and that the hoist-out point was, amazingly enough, the actual helicopter crash site of which everyone was searching.

I met Paul, the victim's boyfriend, on the hike out of the field. He was being escorted by the National Guard (NG) horse team. I spoke with the NG team, and they informed me that Paul knew that his girlfriend was killed in the crash. I was greatly relieved to see that he was not handcuffed, as previously instructed by the FC. Paul was concerned about Jonas and stated that Jonas was one of his best friends.

LAFB arrived in base at about 5:41pm; I looked at my watch when this was reported. Remote camp leadership was given to LAFB shortly after.

We heard radio operator "CD1" request to relay a lengthy set of mission assignments to remote camp. Andy S asked for a delay in the communications while the remote camp leadership was transferred to LAFB.

After the transfer, remote camp copied the mission statements. They stated that they would not be able to put people on the missions, as people were already deployed in the field on existing assignments and would have to return from assignments before new assignments could be given.

It appeared to me from the radio traffic that IC did not know where the crash site was. Missions 51-54 were a set of coordinates of possible crash site locations that needed to be searched.

Shortly after this set of mission assignments were relayed, team traffic between ridge relay, remote base, and Team-A indicated that the crash site had been found, and that they were searching the site.

I met Marc B and Jason W on the trail just before reaching remote base at about 6:30pm.

When I arrived at remote base, I met with LAFB for team assignments. My initial assignment from IC was Ham radio communications back to base. Camp communications were being executed by Andy S. Andy could communicate with "CD1" and high bird. He could also communicate with Lobo 440 and with a radio relay on the Santa Fe Baldy ridge line to other teams in the field. I was not able to reach IC directly on my (unknown to me at the time) non-functioning Ham radio. It was decided that Andy should continue as radio communications at camp.

Jonas was resting in a tent set up for treating wet and hypothermic people in advanced base camp. Mike O and I began to cook food for others in camp. Our plan was to cook for the ridge relay team and Team-A at the crash site.

Jonas asked if it was normal to hallucinate from lack of sleep, lack of food, or from cold. He stated that he had been hallucinating during the walk out. It was clear that Jonas was spent and needed to be walked out. After feeding Jonas, we began walking him out at about 8:20 pm. We radioed CD1 to inform him of our team members and movements.

The crash site team (aka Team-A) was picked up by Lobo 404 on top of the ridge.

As we walked out, CD1 continued to relay very complex mission assignments to the remaining teams in the field.

We spotted a mountain lion on the hike out about one mile from remote camp.

We arrived at the ski lodge at 12:00pm midnight.

While there, we met with the team that found the crash site. They relayed to me the *extreme* risk that they took to reach the site, involving rappels over ice and loose rock on 8 mm ropes tied together. The Team-A members were concerned and angry that they were not fully informed that the victim had been hoisted out, as they were working under the assumption that they were traveling to the coordinates of the victim. They did not learn that the victim was hoisted out until after they had left the field. Undue risk was taken trying to get to a victim that was already hoisted to safety.

The plan for the next day was for them to return with NG for at helicopter insert at first light to continue the search at the crash site.

When I arrived at the ski lodge, a policies overhead team member (gray FC shirts) team was conducting debriefings. The debriefing was hostile and accusatory. Andy S. complained to me that the people doing the debriefing were putting words in the report that were not representative of what he was saying. It appeared that only certain things were being recorded and not merely factual information. At one point, I was told that AMRC had killed Andy because we did not follow the FC's task assignments for missions 51-53.

I decided that I was too tired for the drive back to Albuquerque and chose to sleep in the ski lodge.

A combined team of AMRC, APD, and NG were flown to the crash site the next morning. Other than the AMRC team members being flown to the crash site, no other AMRC team members remained in the field. I was the only AMRC team member still in base.

I monitored radio traffic as I left the ski lodge. At one point, I heard base camp telling a team on the ridge that they would be arrested if they descended the 800ft from their location to help at the crash site. I also heard radio traffic regarding a horse team that was in the process of moving towards the site from Pecos for radio support. The team was told that they would be arrested if they continued.

As I was leaving the ski lodge, I stopped at the base in search of coffee. I had stepped out of my car to call home when I was approached by James N. He stated that I had to leave base camp **immediately**. I told him that I was on my way home and had only stopped for coffee. He informed me that AMRC was no longer allowed to participate on the mission, and that any AMRC members who tried to join the mission was be stopped (implied arrested) by State Police. He asked that I call AMRC to cancel any team members en route.

I asked him what I had done wrong. He stated that I had done nothing wrong and gave me a compliment on my support in helping to organize our team in base camp. I asked him if the "no AMRC members rule" applied to the AMRC team members currently being flown to the crash site. He stated that Justin Shook was APD, not AMRC. (Justin

Shook is VP of AMRC). I asked him about AMRC paramedic team member Rusty and AMRC team member Steve H who were also on the aircraft.

James N. would not comment on why AMRC was no longer allowed to precipitate on the mission. He only stated that it was a legal matter that the state lawyers would be addressing next week. It appeared to me that the hostile debriefing was used to formulate a story that was negative towards AMRC. Not addressing the "issue" at hand and uniformly not allowing AMRC to participate in the mission reduced the overall ability of the SAR mission.


After hearing threats of arrest for the 4th time on the mission, I left as requested.

SAR MISSION REPORT

March 25, 2010

ANDREW SIMMONS REPORT

NM State Police Helicopter Crash Mission 09-01-05



Attachment 8

NM State Police Helicopter Crash Mission Report

Report by:

**Andrew Simmons, AMRC rescue leader
Advance Base Camp Operations and Communications**

Mission No: 09-01-05

Date: 6/10/09

Prior to Advance Base:

I responded to a team page, the second wave of mission page out calls, at around 8 am on 6/10/09. After learning about the severe weather conditions I packed for winter weather and meet Bill Scherzinger around 9 am. We gathered more team technical gear and more bad weather equipment, tents, clothes, sleeping bags, stoves, etc. We packed and departed Albuquerque around 9:30 am. We arrived at base camp around 11 am and were immediately joined with other AMRC resources forming field teams. AMRC formed two field teams, ASAR formed one field team and APD formed a foot and horseback team. I was assigned into the second AMRC field team, team 13. Team 13 had the mission to setup and stock the advance base camp at Puerto Nambe which would be used by field teams to rest, restock and reorganize. After advance base was set we were to continue up toward the suspected crash location and support more advance teams that were travelling faster with lighter loads. Our team was also told to keep a lookout and try to locate a missing team of two AMRC members from team 6 that had not been heard of in a long time. The weather at this time was still rainy and cold at incident base with snow in higher elevations with no sign of getting better. We prepared for bad storm conditions. An APD horse team was brought in to carry heavy gear to advance base, but they had no pack animals and securing loads to the riders proved problematic. In reality the five teams (two AMRC, one ASAR and two APD) all entered the field roughly the same time heading up the Windsor Trail. All five teams entering the field were given roughly similar missions with no detail given to route, terrain or conditions. In reality we were a big group of rescuers all entering the field together with the same mission and goal.

During the hike in on the Windsor trail communications quickly became difficult to incident base, which was placed down the road from the trail head. I was handling communications for team 13. For a majority of the field work we relied upon the radio relay CD1 to communicate to base. While on the trail it became obvious that crucial mission information was changing. We heard something about an airlift that occurred at the crash site. Many attempts were made via radio relay to get more information about the airlift. As a search team we needed to know how many subjects we were looking for. This information was unavailable or not given for many hours causing great confusion in the field teams. We had three known subjects on the helicopter (pilot, spotter and hiker), one known subject camped around Lake Katherine (hiker's boyfriend) and two potential subjects from the missing team 6.

Along the trail we encountered Mark Olah, one of the AMRC members from team 6. Mark was alone, without a pack and obviously very tired and distraught. Mark gave us this report of Team 6, originally made of 4 members. They split the previous night as one member needed to return to base with signs of frostbite. Mark Olah and Jonas Anderson, both full AMRC team members

but who are both new to our team and to SAR in general continued into the field as team 6. They continued in severe conditions into very steep alpine terrain. When they were close to turning back they made contact with one subject, the spotter from the crash. They attempted to warm the hypothermic and injured subject giving him all the extra clothes available. Due to the terrain they were not able to establish radio contact, and due to the cold their radio batteries were close to dead. They made the choice to split the team into two individuals, Jonas stayed with the subject, trying to keep warm. Mark left his pack and extra gear and hiked until he got radio contact again. Mark had to travel a long distance to get radio contact; after he made contact he was too tired to return to Jonas and started to return to base. Mark's radio quickly died with no more replacement batteries. Mark supplied GPS coordinates of Jonas and the subject, and said he had not been to the crash site, although thought it could not be far from that location. Furthermore, Mark said that he thought he knew the hiker subject in the crash. Mark was very tired but assured us he could return safely to base along the Windsor Trail. I radioed the essence of this brief to Base through CD1, stating that Mark was returning alone, that we had one rescuer stranded alone with the subject without a radio and relayed the new GPS location. We requested again for clarification of whom and how many subjects were involved in the airlift, and again the information was unavailable. Due to the lack of good information and communication to Base we had to assume all possible subjects were still in the field. We also became very worried about the lone rescuer stranded in very serious alpine conditions. At this point Jonas became a high priority subject.

During the remainder of the travel up the trail to Puerto Nambe repeated attempts were made via radio relay to get better information or mission updates from base with no success. Several attempts were also made a cell phone contact directly to incident base, but service was not available. As we moved up the trail our team talked and strategized with the ASAR team. We also communicated with the other AMRC team and APD teams via radio. It was mutually decided, as we were all so close in travel time that we would regroup at Puerto Nambe to discuss the new mission situation as a group since communications and information from Base were bad to non-existent.

Advance Base Camp:

An advance base camp was set up at the Puerto Nambe area to organize, facilitate and support field operations. The necessity of an advance base camp was due to several key factors: First, the weather conditions during the beginning of the mission were severe winter blizzard type conditions, advance base was established to primarily be a safe retreat for teams needing to escape further inclement weather. Second, the distance from incident base and the Windsor trail head was long and a central organizational point for personnel and equipment was needed. Third, due to terrain, communications with incident base was very limited and advance base served as a key communication hub.

Setup and creation of advance base was a collaboration of multiple field teams that ended up travelling the Windsor Trail at the same time and each supplying equipment and personnel. When advance base was created an obvious lack of clear communications and real time information or command from incident base made field operation ineffective. A group meeting was held among the rescue leaders and team leaders from all teams at advance base. Marc Beverly offered to take the rescue leader / field command of advance base, all agreed. I assumed the role of communications and operational scribe. The situations of the mission had dramatically changed since our initial task assignments, we had a missing rescuer and an airlift had occurred with no information on who was removed from the field. After many hours and

many attempts for information and direction from incident base it became clear that a severe lack of communications made incident base ineffective. Furthermore with the winter alpine conditions were a real concern about safety higher on the mountain. All the field teams were mixed with personnel that were in various physical conditions and had various alpine skill levels. It was decided that the strongest member both in skill sets and physical condition should be pulled from various teams and make a strike team to access the known coordinates which were most probably the airlift location, the last known point of Jonas and near the crash site. Other teams were also formed from various members of field teams based on the strengths and situations at the time. Since personnel were being reformed into new team units I logged each new team with names and mission and assigned them a separate letter designation as to not confuse them with the original team numbers.

I knew that the personnel reassignments into different teams at advance base had potential for confusion, I was very careful to send all of our actions at advance base to incident base via the radio relay CD1. I would like to note that I made many update communication calls to incident base throughout the afternoon trying to keep them up to date with every move, change and decision we made. I later learned on debrief that incident base had no record of any of the countless communications and information I had sent to them via relay all afternoon. A very serious communication break down seemed to have occurred. I know that I had good copy on all transmissions to and from the radio relay CD1; however the communication and information relay must have broken down after that point unknown to any of the field teams. As I had good copy with CD1 we assumed that incident command was in touch with our actions and the lack of direction or information from command was sign that the field teams and advance base were working to incident bases satisfaction. This unknown communication hole was the single failure that accounted for a major disconnect of field teams from incident command.

Detailed Account of Advance Base Team and Mission Assignments:

Advance Base Camp Staff:

- Marc Beverly - advance base field leader
- Andrew Simmons - advance base operations and communications
- Jason Williams
- Bill Scherzinger

Team A:

- Rich Siemer
- Steve Hall
- Justin Shook
- Rusty Denisch

Communications:

Several radios w/ NM SAR and HAM capability

Mission:

To access the last known GPS coordinates of the missing rescuer Jonas near "Hidden Lake." At that location search to find the missing rescuer, the helicopter crash site believed to be near by, and locate any and all of the three subjects aboard the helicopter.

Equipment:

Team was equipped with personal mountain survival gear, a tent, sleeping bags and limited technical gear.

Mission Updates:

- We discovered that team A did not take the ridgeline up and over Baldy as first thought, but instead chose to access the site via Lake Katherine and then climbing over the ridge to "Hidden Lake." This posed a problem as no teams were covering the high ridgeline which might be the exit route for Jonas.
- When Jonas was located the team was asked to focus all attention on finding the crash site and the still missing subjects involved in the crash for as long as safe weather conditions permitted.
- With helpful information from Jonas Team A located the crash site just before 6pm. They located and turned off the ELT in the tail section. The wreckage was very spread in difficult terrain and they attempted a search for the two subjects still missing.
- Around 8pm the weather conditions were getting worse and the difficult rocks were becoming iced up. Movement and travel became a safety hazard. They made the call and coordinated with the National Guard helicopter assisting their search to be extracted from the ridgeline.

Debrief of Mission:

(Note, as the team did not exit the field through advance base this debrief was accomplished later.) Team A used trails to access Lake Katherine, from Lake Katherine they climbed the steep slope to the north of the lake to access the ridge between Lake Katherine and "Hidden Lake." This ascent proved to be difficult due to the steep terrain and snow. From the ridge they started to descend into the bowl of hidden lake which proved to be very steep technical terrain with steep snow gullies and many cliff bands. A National Guard helicopter joined and coordinated with the team to search the area of "Hidden Lake." When Jonas was located and debriefed at advance base his descriptions of the crash site helped the team to visually locate the crash site and develop a search pattern for the missing subjects. The team split into two groups, one group accessed the wreckage, found the tail section and turned off the emergency beacon. The other group searched the steep slopes above the wreckage for the missing subjects based on the description that they were both ejected while the helicopter rolled down hill. The team was not able to find the two missing subjects. When the sun set over the ridge the wet rock and snow started to become iced up and the conditions became too dangerous to continue searching. The team coordinated with the National Guard helicopter to make a landing on the ridge line and extract the team via the air, which was successful.

Team B:

- Jim Busse
- Will Romero
- Quintana
- Michael Gibson
- Pat Chavez (only on return to base portion)
- (All members of original team 8)

Communications:

Several radios w/ NM SAR and capability

Mission:

They were to access Lake Catherine and locate the missing subject at the camp site.

Equipment:

Team was equipped with personal mountain survival gear

Mission Updates:

- Came in contact with a horse team that was with the subject from the camp (the boyfriend) they joined with the horse team and escorted the subject back to advance base.
- They escorted the boyfriend subject back to incident base after a break at advance base.

Debrief of Mission:

Team B traveled via trail toward Lake Katherine. They meet with a horse team that was already in the field whom had the boyfriend with them. They joined this team and returned to advance base shortly before 5pm. The boyfriend needed food and rest before the long hike back to incident base. The horse team decided to return to base. After about a half hour break they escorted the boyfriend back to incident base via the Windsor Trail.

Team C:

- Richard Hoyle
- Carrie Haines

Communications:

Two radios w/ NM SAR and HAM capability

Mission:

They were to setup a suitable radio relay location on the high ridge toward Baldy to keep teams in contact that were behind the ridgeline once in the "Hidden Lake" bowl.

Equipment:

Team was equipped with personal mountain survival gear, and HAM radios.

Mission Updates:

- When it was discovered that Team A did not take the high ridgeline to access "Hidden Lake" team C was instructed to move higher up the ridgeline, over Baldy and try to access the high ridgeline over "Hidden Lake" to sweep for Jonas and any subjects. The radio relay station would be formed again with members from team D whom would follow them up the ridge.
- When Jonas was located the team had reached the summit of Baldy and could visually sweep the high ridgeline. Due to the weather and time of day the team did not want to continue on the ridgeline and returned to advance base meeting up with team D.

Debrief of Mission:

The team travelled up the ridgeline from advance base to a saddle to form a high radio relay location. They acted as a good radio relay to team A until we discovered that team A had not taken the high ridge as first thought. At that point they left the radio relay location, which would be established again by team D, and climbed higher up the ridgeline and to the top of Baldy where they could see most of the ridgeline over "Hidden Lake." When Jonas was found the team was on top of Baldy. Due to the weather and late time of day it was decided that the safe action was to return to advance base. While returning to advance base they joined with team D.

Team D:

- Carlos Cox
- Matt Schmit
- Sandra Ely
- Rachiel Putnam
- Fred Gross

Communications:

Several radios w/ NM SAR capability

Mission:

They were to climb the high ridge toward "Hidden Lake" behind team C to support the smaller two person team if needed and also to establish the radio relay position again on the ridge.

Equipment:

Team was equipped with personal mountain survival gear.

Mission Updates:

- Two members formed and staffed a new radio relay location, the other three member continued higher in support of Team C.
- When Jonas was located they meet with team C and returned to base.

Debrief of Mission:

The team travelled up the ridgeline from advance base to Baldy. Two members stayed behind to form a new radio relay high on the ridge to maintain communications with Team A. Three members climbed higher on the ridge to support team C. When Jonas was located the teams waited for and meet with team C. Two members stayed to man the radio relay position and all others returned to advance base. It was decided that the weather and late time of day made continuing over the ridge unwise. All team members returned to advance base before dark in two waves, the second wave being the radio relay that stayed in position until Team A was beginning to the extracted.

Team E:

- Chad Melvin
- Stella Cadebria
- Alex Catsis

Communications:

One radio w/ NM SAR

Mission:

To clear the trails to Spirit Lake and continue on the trails to Stewart Lake in search of Jonas or other subjects if they took the lower trail exits from the area.

Equipment:

Team was equipped with personal mountain survival gear.

Mission Updates:

- Jonas walked into advance base shortly after the team went into the field. The team was recalled to advance base.

Debrief of Mission:

Team did not get very far into the field when Jonas walked back into advance base around 5:45pm. They were recalled to base as Jonas was the only likely subject to be on the long lower trails that exit the area. The team made up of all APD members could not spend the night in the field and departed for incident base soon after.

Team Request 51-54:

Around 5:45pm, just after when Jonas walked back into advance base, I copied a request from incident base relayed by CD 1 for four new team assignments. This was a busy time at advance base as Jonas had just walked into base. I was surprised by the request as it came so late in the day and since base should have known most personnel were already committed by my constant radio updates. I copied all the information on the four team request and relayed to CD1 that I had them copied, that we did not have people to staff them all at the moment and that we would look at how to fill them as soon as possible. At advance base we had a serious shortage of personnel that was able to remain in the field for new task assignments, however a large support team was due very soon to resupply and man the advance base through the night. We choose to wait for the support team to properly staff these new task assignments. Soon after 6pm Team A got visual contact with the wreckage which was relayed via radio to incident base. Since the four new task assignments were GPS coordinates to search for the crash location, and we now knew the crash location we assumed these new task assignments would need to be changed as they no longer made sense. Soon after the support team arrived these four task assignment request were passed and reviewed to the new rescue leader to fill.

Transfer of Advance Base Camp to Second Unit:

The support team arrived at advance base around 6:20pm. Shortly after we established their team leader and began a transfer of field leader and operations as our crew were not able to spend another night in the field. Most of our members and field teams had been on the mission since the night before. Frenando Garzone from the Los Alamos Fire Brigade was identified to take over the field command of advance base. Marc Beverly and I went over with Frenando the notes on what had happened through the day, reviewed the map of the area, the new task assignment request, and a status of teams still in the field. With the transfer complete Marc Beverly and a few others departed for incident base. I remained at advance base to escort Jonas back to incident base; he needed time to rest before the hike out. I helped Frenando with communications until all the field teams had been accounted for back at advance base or via extraction. We departed advance base around 8:30pm with Jonas.


When I arrived at incident base I was debriefed. At the debrief I first learned of total communication and information failure. It was only at this debrief that I realize that incident command was totally out step with what had occurred in the field and that all of my information and radio traffic to CD1 all day had been lost. I attempted to share in the debrief what we did by the new team assignments we had made, but they insisted on relating all debriefs to original team numbers which was chaotic at best. During the debrief everyone remained professional, but the mode turned very hostile. They refused to recognize Jonas as a subject, suggesting he was a rescuer whom should take care of himself. In my opinion when the National Guard helicopter picked up the subject and left Jonas alone in alpine blizzard conditions he was no longer a rescuer, but very much a subject. Furthermore I was made to feel to blame for the communication problems and it was suggested that we were out of line in our actions at advance base. Our actions at advance base were always with goal and intent of our original mission, which was to establish a camp and support teams to access the crash site and search for the missing subjects. We accomplished the original mission and secured a rescuer in danger at the same time. Due to the communication and command problems we had to make some critical choices in the field, I stand by those decisions.

In closing this mission report I want to say this was a tragic event by all counts. I know that emotions and stress were high on everyone involved. There were problems on the mission, unexplained massive communication holes and a breakdown in the information chain which made incident command ineffective. I hope that when all the information is reviewed that some good learning will occur across the board.

SAR MISSION REPORT

March 25, 2010

COMMUNICATION LOG



Attachment 9

New Mexico Department of Public Safety
Search and Rescue Office
COMMUNICATION LOG

Mission Number	Operational Period	Date	Page
09-01- 6605		6-9-09	1 of 9
Prepared by: Name <i>Cowan</i>	Title		

Time	Resource	Communication
8:10 PM		CD-1 open
9:29	Base	sending 2 teams to Puerto Nambe Lake 1/2 the way
9:34		Subject extricated by 606 now looking for boyfriend
9:37		SP says another aircraft needed right away
		NG puts P at airport
9:41		NG going to find 606
9:41	Base	is standing down - no more radio transmissions!
9:48	SP 77	APD seeking air support, ambulance on way
		Frank 262 291-9451
10:08		690-0542 radio call
10:15	Base	432.938 3963.536 3 km SW of Spirit Lake
10:40	SST	rec'd page - need trailers & mapping personnel
		called radio - suggested ELAFRCC for possible ELT report
1113	TI	429.507 3963.287, 2 lines trail to Vega cutoff
1121	TI	steady rain
1124	Base	432.306 3964.779 m 251
1132	Sub 454	inbound 15 min out
1135		Steve Crawford - TV trucks on way to base
1141	Base	we can't TI - bring us back, is there? NO!
1143	TI	# subjects? 3
1145	Sub 454	could cover - would try road side
		road side can't get in - working
1158	TI	431.127 3963.432 their location
1213	T3 & T4	headed out 3 on each team
1214	Base	TI - have 2 at top of ridge
1214	Sub	still can't get in
1218	Paul	arriving to base, headed out?

Mission Number		Operational Period	Prepared by: Name	Date	Page #
09-01-05			Cavan	6-10-09	1 B
Time	Resource	Communication			
1219	Lobo	head to n side of Baldy			
1220	Brigade	head out w/4 people			
1221	Lobo	not hearing anything on 121.5			
1223	"	2nd Black Hawk head out			
1230	T1	431.826 3963.262			
1233		145.19 not working			
	W/D 5101				
1240	Lobo	clears by Baldy			
1241	"	lights 1/2 mi N of coordination			
	"	454- 35-50.60 105.45.00			
		.9 mi e of point ↑			
1253	Lobo	can't get in - will keep trying			
		La Vega Meadow 429.3 3963.9 10200'			
		105-46.95 35-49.1			
1:01	T1	454 just flew over			
1:05	all teams	proceed to 430.657 3965.918			
		35-50.209 105-46.101			
1:15	T3 & T4	P2 crossed North Lake turnoff			
		T1 taking short cut to SF Baldy then to site			
1:20	T1 & 2	432.100 3964.325			
1:23	T3 & 4	at La Vega & Winsor intersection			
1:30	Lobo 573	2nd Black Hawk in contact on 454			
1:32	454	no luck at east location - returning to 1st one			
1:36	base	SAR 2 151.37			
		R2 Yoonie Team Leader			
		3 & 4 mobile TL			
	T4	at La Vega Winsor - Unit R			
1:47	Lobo 454	3rd 1st coord. - nothing			
1:55	base	2nd Helicopters in AM?			
1:58	Lobo	hearing in for gas			
2:09	Lobo 573	steel cart got in			
2:25	13 & 6	T1 431.421 3964.964			
2:27		T3 J w/ La Vega			

New Mexico Department of Public Safety
Search and Rescue Office
COMMUNICATION LOG

Mission Number 09 - 01 - 05	Operational Period	Date 6-10-09	Page 2 2 of 9
Prepared by: Name Gwen	Title		

Time	Resource	Communication
2:27	T6	429.053 3963072
2:47	base	1215 signal - No from both helicopters
2:54	T1	top of Babler proceeding NW
"	T1	mod wind 1" snow 50 visibility
		intermittent sleet & snow
3:14	573	in 300 mps minor EL Thud & no wreckage seen
3:15	T7	at Wilderness Pt to
	573	going back for fuel
3:21	base	123.025 for air ops.
3:23	T1	relay on ridge way?
3:24	T3	no answer
3:30	relay	at & exhausted returning to base
3:31	T1	431.47 3965.359 heavy sleet 2" snow
3:33	T6	431.045 3963.719
3:34	T5	427.495 3963.173
3:35	T7	427.970 3962.741
3:41	T4	out of 160 + 403
3:50	T1	radio check heard to position ground
4:10	T1	no wind 2" snow .35 in c
4:11	T1	at Webster & Burr were relay
4:15	T46	431.911 3964.314
4:18	T7	429.121 3962.213
4:41	T1	win 250' of east 430.621 3965.241
"	T1	did sound sweep no results
4:54	base	will now use 146.82 to talk to base, not 155.160
	NSZUS	146.82 PL = 162.2
5:02	base	Bob Reiden 281-9491 called for Frank
5:06	T1	turning radio off for 1 1/2 hours

Mission Number		Operational Period	Prepared by: Name	Date	Page #
09-01-05					2 B
Time	Resource	Communication			
0511		John Teell - 203-356-0101 br. map			
0515	Base	Locations?			
	T4	9600' on 162 trail			
	5	no response			
	6	" "			
	7	429.692 3963.287 spending night there			
536	T6	1 member getting frostbite 2 went 3 coming back			
		4001 from top of SF Baldy			
		Mark Anderson Prof. Jorgensen			
543	IB 146.92	Hunt down T5 115205			
545	T-5				
	T-6	Sawney had near top of SF Baldy vis 100'			
	Relay Team	Can hear T-5 0427133 3964909 = T5			
5:52	T1?	Hear T-5 " " " " " " mostly just noise. ??			
	Base	Try to reach T-6 by UTM			
0605	T6	UTM 0431445 396554-6, Vay W. W. - 100' vis.			
0615	T4	28862 66255 Team T2 & T3 are together.			
	T1	On move, ask IB,			
		IB says standby - In light snow, 2003' snow			
		vis 100' for 100' - 100' - 100'			
		Physical condition Plmon. 16' out, could see 100' - 100'			
0627	Relay-T4	Are other teams on 162 trail? T4, T6			
	T-7	? heavy current location, to return heavy litter at location, not prepared to head into deep snow.			
	IB	T1 need 2nd person to go 4 members.			
	T-5	Relay message 6 persons to 2 T-3 & T-4 ask IB			
		if they can split 1 back to report to IB			
	T1	Headed east on ridge line to ridge line			
	IB	Instr. for T1 9 431205 x 3965654 - another			
		ELP location then rendezvous with T6			
		Should be on path to T6 - Plz call when met T6			
		T3 - people to Aspen? T3 - all go to Aspen Ridge - Torant & Torant's			
		picture 6 people need coffee.			
		Check T6 location			

**New Mexico Department of Public Safety
Search and Rescue Office
COMMUNICATION LOG**

Mission Number	Operational Period	Date	Page
09 - 01 - 05		6-17-02	of 9
Prepared by: Name	Title		
Richard [unclear]			

Time	Resource	Communication
0704	T4	UTM E, ⁸⁸⁵⁶ 42285 ³ 66298 T3-T4 Gwy to 1000' vent / loss
0712	T6	6431770 396546 other ops 802
0715	T1	
0717	IB	Need coord T7, what happened to T6 exp 802
		Do they have comm capability
	T7	429687 3963276
	T6-C	Comm on 160 Just passed T7.
	T1	Gwy to about on mesh with T6
		Way point is 15 mi down off
		5 mi north. Review between T1 & T6 on road.
0730	T6	Headed for point - last seen
0732	IB	on T3 & T4 Gwy to Aspen Branch - no response
		Where is the road? OK. Maybe no coffee.
		Where is the mountain trail. Continue on road to
		Pacific Canyon Road.
0735	T6	Heavy trouble with radio battery. Break and eat.
		At point - last seen
	IB	To all teams returning to IB. Need confirmation
		except T3 & T4 ^{Aspen Branch} T5 1000'
0742	T1	Camp
0742	T6-C	Camp
0743	T5	Camp
0746	T7	Camp
0747	IB	Ski Lodge Open - Had Bearings & Found
	IB	T5 UTM? 428252 3965910
	T1	Position 431142 42 3965473
0803	CO	T3 - no response
0820	7-5018	Fernando Garcia - Fire Brig. Do they need assistance? He will try contacts, Steve Howards

Mission Number		Operational Period	Prepared by: Name	Date	Page# 3
09-01-05					B
Time	Resource	Communication			
	IB	Gage			
		Gage Williams			
	TG	-			
		IB = NS2US NOVA-?			
3:40	Sta. Lory ¹⁶⁰	Via Gage on lower canyon			
	T1	Lake Kothman Trail Saddle. On early Saddle, heading home.			
8:45	Relay Team	T1 - communication via K. K. on Old Town Park by Lot			
9:52	IB	Working on location on all team			
	T1	Lake K. Kothman Trail Saddle			
	T5	NR			
	T6-C	NR			
	TAC-1	At gate towards Aspen Ranch			
	T7	Through Wilderness Gate ~ 1 min ago.			
	T4	5 min climb out of Nambe Canyon, at Aspen Ranch ~ 1 hr.			
	T1	Lauren Brubaker - message -			
		St. Johns C. 9:00-6:00			
		Brubaker - message - close to the wilderness			
		then... ✓ to Register			
09:14	IB	T7?			
09:15	T7	Back at vehicle			
09:25	SF - mobile Air-IB op ²	Continued area, SE corner ele 11500-12500 at high pt NW down drain ~ 2 mi 121.5 pl. DS			
09:32	T5	042 39 up 403 exhausted. Total over 2 hrs.			
	TAC-1	105,8320 35,803 Z			
09:40	T6-C	Relay team trial as well -			
	T4	Relay via TAC-1 - about 45 min. out.			
09:55	mobile ¹⁶⁰ op ²	Help back at base, hobs 573, in Santa Fe.			
10:00	CD-1	to IB KSNV relayed messages since 09:32.			
10:15	TAC-1	Have T3 & T4 heading to IB.			
10:18	T-1	Very weak reception. Crossing Nambe Creek - Location T-1 IB			
10:34	T-1	T-2 just passed on trail.			
10:38	T-2 795	Dave Coleman MCC - do they need relay 662-2673			
10:44	mobile Op ²	hobbying hobs 573 454			
10:46	IB	IB says MCC plz stand by. ✓ telephone to Dave.			
	IB	Call for T-6			

**New Mexico Department of Public Safety
Search and Rescue Office
COMMUNICATION LOG**

Mission Number	Operational Period	Date	Page
09 - 01 - 05		6-10-09	4 of 9
Prepared by: Name	Title		
Richard Brown			

Time	Resource	Communication
10:57	→ T6	No response — relayed to IB.
10:58	T1	1
11:15	→ T6	No contact.
11:25	T1	At Wilderness Golf Don't need rds, ^{coffee & rolls} Debris at CPP Trailer
11:34	T8	Radio check.
11:35	→ T6	No response
11:40	T6	0432760 — 5 mi away — Lake Basin (1) East of Lake. Wesley — had hypoxia
	T13	Radio check
	IB	To verify subject's mental health ^{Wesley} Good health — after cold told 2 hrs ago.
12:06	T14	Radio check — to IB
	T13	IB at Windsor Trail head. 5 members
	T14	Right behind T13 at Windsor.
		35 546 105 44.705 Approx 1/2 mi. N
	T8	Radio check.
	hubs -	Coord. for 454. 1350.546, 10544.705 WGS 23-55
	USAR Truck 6	En route to command Post — Truck and service ~ 3 mi. from rd
12:23	T12	On Windsor Trail Lt. Jalce Salazar Sgt Steve Hall
12:32		IB direct to USAR Truck 6
12:41	base	air 573?
12:48	T8	speak
12:53	Pobo 454	On board headed for Pt. Vincen to
109	T13	turnoff to Narke Shutes
		10300 trying to contact T6 member at 216
	T1	
123	2	no answer
123	5	x 4 at
	6	

9
10
H
12-14

Mission Number		Operational Period	Prepared by: Name	Date	Page #
09-01-05				6-10-09	4 B
Time	Resource	Communication			
122	T10	Rue to Nambé 5 on team & the Hall			
	17+4	Wrote post Nambé Creek			
124	T10	Dying & locate 1 TB member			
125	T8	transmission OK 430.281 3963.187			
	T9	no answer			
	T11	" "			
127	T12	" "			
131		Horse team fording Nambé creek			
135	base	6, 9, 11, + 12?			
136	T6	no response			
"	T9	" "			
"	T11	" "			
137	T12	" "			
140	T13	at know about Mark - at base?			
"	"	who extracted? don't know			
	T10	where is backpack?			
201	T10	Mark coming down from wilderness state			
202	base	T8 direct to base of Jones TB area and.			
		if OK go to crash site.			
		432.769 3966.518			
		base T9 + 11 + 12 proceed to			
		432.208 3966.177			
210	T8	13 14 + 10 further up W side than T8			
211	base	10 picked up by friend? NO!			
213	T13	was 13, 10, + 14 at Rue to Nambé ^{already} ^{at base}			
218	T9, 11, 12	no reply			
225	^{advance} base	all teams → 8, 12, 13, 10 + horse team + OK			
		Mark Beverly team leader			
		A - horses lake 3 people + support			
		tent + supplies			
		B - going to Lake K.			
		Levy 160 - on 145.19			

**New Mexico Department of Public Safety
Search and Rescue Office
COMMUNICATION LOG**

Mission Number 09-01-05	Operational Period	Date 6-10-09	Page 5 of 7
Prepared by: Name	Title		

Time	Resource	Communication
240	AB	A- Rich Feemer Line Hall Justin Hark Rusty Kervish - up ridge to crash site at Helen Lake
		B- rep of T8 - go to Lake K. + check campers Rich Richard Hughes Sam Barnes Mark Barnaby - scene leader andy Jimmons
	base	teams to LKP of Jones? yes team A
	AB	have team going out need more teams to bring in litter + wheel + stream support food, water, stove
	"	gloves, warm clothes, heavy packs
252	"	living spots for victims - rubber gloves
	"	TB Post change - at AB how team? APB team T11
302		IB - ADBASE CONFIRM 4 MEMBERS
305		ADBASE ASKS AGAIN FOR IDENTITY OF RESCUED PERSON, ANS. NO LOCATION WOF EXTRACTION
311		FIND T9 NO ANSWER
313		IB CANNOT GIVE OUT NAME ADBASE WHERE IS SINGLE MEMBER T9
324		MARK OLHA IS OK
324		IC PRIORITY JONAS, CRASH SITE, BOY FRIEND RELAY TO ADBASE
331		HARVINGTON BOY FRIEND LEFT T9 TO SEARCH ALONE FOR GIRL

OVER

**New Mexico Department of Public Safety
Search and Rescue Office
COMMUNICATION LOG**

Mission Number	Operational Period	Date	Page
- -			6 of 9
Prepared by: Name	Title		

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